Months before the non-binding consultation on 9 November 2014, the balance between the independence movement's popular autonomy and institutional actions was a critical issue. This was outlined in four scenarios discussed at the second general assembly of the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) in Tarragona in April of that year.
Two of these scenarios, described as 'radical', involved holding a binding referendum. One option was a more or less tolerated referendum, ensuring stability and reliability for universal participation. The other was a unilateral referendum, anticipated due to state opposition, which would make guaranteeing free and universal voting difficult. The first scenario balanced institutional and popular action, while the second leaned heavily towards popular autonomy through direct mobilisation and self-organisation by groups like the ANC, civil and cultural entities, and trade unions.
Institutional Challenges and Popular Response
The remaining two scenarios, termed 'resignation', assumed a referendum could not be held. This might be because the Catalan government deemed the situation unfeasible, or because the Catalan parliament and government were directly intervened by the Spanish state. In both cases, it was accepted that if Catalan institutions gave up or Spain refused a referendum, organised popular political insubordination was not the answer. The independence movement would lose initiative to institutions or submit to state power.
One 'resignation' case involved accepting early plebiscitary elections within the Spanish legal framework, replacing direct popular expression. The other left a unilateral declaration of independence to elected Catalan representatives, such as dissolved or active parliamentary deputies, Catalan deputies in the Spanish congress, and mayors supporting the process. Crucially, this lacked a popular resistance plan to support the new power from the streets.
The strategic discussion within the ANC's roadmap required a choice: either the autonomy of the popular independence movement or subordination to institutional politics. A unity policy from the grassroots would favour the former, involving a political revolt against Spanish legality to defend the right to self-determination. This path would have led to a crisis in Catalonia's party system, marginalised hesitant positions, and demanded new political structures aligned with the dominant street movement.
The Path Forward for Independence
The lack of clarity and decision in choosing a path, both before and especially after 1 October 2017, underpins the concessions and detours that have led to the current situation. Today, when calls are made to regain an independence majority in institutions, the issue remains unresolved and largely unaddressed. Urgent action is needed to set priorities and control the pace. If the movement again trusts that institutional control will restart progress, it will remain within the hegemony of institutional politics, denying the necessary autonomy of the popular movement.
Consequently, there will be a rush to reoccupy positions of power, which stem from and are legally and politically controlled by the Spanish constitution. The unresolved question will resurface: even with the most passionate, determined, and honest parliamentary representatives proclaiming independence, how would it be defended? With what forces? Through what forms of struggle? Not with an anonymous mass summoned from above, led by voluntarist activism, and defenceless against new state repression, but with people specifically organised for the mission, spread across the country, capable of directing prior actions and building organisation.
Action from above leads to haste in starting, calculations before acting, and hesitation and disarray when resisting. Action from below, however, measures time by the movement's pulse, its capacity for intervention, and its spread across the territory. It might take longer to achieve its purpose, but the gains will be firm and defended by mobilised people. An alliance between autonomous institutions and the independence movement seems unlikely. If the street does not take the initiative, autonomous institutions will remain under the state's shadow and will not restart a second phase of the process on their own. Reoccupying parliament without an organised, mobilised, and self-defending street movement would be futile. Conversely, can anyone imagine regaining an independence majority in parliament without a prolonged period of fierce struggle against the state and its autonomist allies? The conflict is between the movement and the state; anything in between is destined for capitulation or irrelevance.
The Broader Catalan Nation
A significant area not addressed by the ANC at that assembly was the concept of the Catalan Countries (Països Catalans). This was consistent with the options studied, which ultimately depended too much on Spain's position. Consequently, both the ANC and institutions implicitly considered the situation in the rest of the Catalan Countries to fall within Spanish legality, assuming those regions would manage on their own. This stance ignored that the state's strategy towards the Catalan nation was, and is, singular, using colonial strangulation and linguistic genocide as weapons.
What happened in the Balearic Islands, the Valencian Country, and La Franja served as a warning, showing what was starting to happen in Catalonia with Spanish in schools. This ostrich-like attitude raised fears of tactical weaknesses that could end in strategic surrenders, such as the death of the language, 'democratically' decided by new 'independent' institutions to avoid 'social fracture'. This is the current situation, where the Catalan government has become an accomplice before becoming a definitive victim.
Furthermore, this vagueness regarding the entire nation ignored that the widespread struggles for language and schools were not, and are not, desperate acts of resistance. Instead, they are conclusive examples of sustained mobilisation and self-organisation. As seen in the streets of Valencia last week, these actions create weaknesses in the state's structures of domination. This clearly shows that language, defended in every corner, is not merely an instrument, pretext, means, subject, or part of an integration programme, but demonstrates the persistence of the entire nation in the consciousness of the popular classes.
